BRYANT v. LEFEVRE.

The acts of the husband which are powerless to defeat, ought
not be suffered to impair the value of the wife's dower beyond their
necessary results under the American rule. Creditors who take
the husband's lands by levy take them subject to the contingency
of the wife's claim of dower. Those who derive their title from
the levying creditors take it with the same burden as though they
derived it directly from the husband by a levy on the parcel which
they own. The division by the levying creditors of the tract levied
on as the husband's property, and the sale of it to various parties
in small lots, and the improvements made by the owners of the
other lots must be regarded, if they have tended to enhance the
value of the defendant's lot, and consequently of the dower to be
assigned therein, as among the "other causes" and "other circumstances" to the benefit of which the dowress is entitled.
The language quoted from the decisions applies only to the lot in
which dower is demanded in the suit, and not to other land of the
husband, though alienated at the same time and by the same act.
The plaintiff is entitled to have her dower assigned in the lot
held in severalty by this defendant precisely as though that lot had
been aliened by the husband as a distinct estate and by a separate
conveyance.
Judgment for demandant for her dower accordingly.
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The access of air to the chimneys of a building cannot, as against the owner of
neighboring land, be claimed either as a natural right of property or as an easement by prescription.
The plaintiff and the defendants were occupiers of adjoining houses, and for
more than twenty years the occupiers of the plaintiff's house had enjoyed access
of air to the chimneys of it. Subsequently the defendants piled timber on the top
of their house so as to overtop the plaintiff's chimneys and cause them to smoke.
In an action by the plaintiff to recover damages for the nuisance so caused, Held,
that the action could not- be maintained, either on the ground that an easement
had been acquired, or on the ground that the defendants had created a nuisance.

THIS was an action to recover damages for a nuisance caused by
the defendants having obstructed the free access of air to the chimneys of the plaintiff's house.
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At the trial, before Lord COLERIDGE, C. J., judgment was
entered for the plaintiff, and the defendants appealed. The facts
and arguments fully appear in the judgments.
Gates, Q. 0., and Edward Clarke, for the defendants, relied on
Webb v. Bird, 13 C. B. N. S. 841.
Staveley Hill, Q. C., and Cock, for the plaintiff;
BRAMWELL, L. J.-The plaintiff says that he is possessed of a
house, that for more than twenty years this house and its occupants
have had the wind to blow to, over and from it, and that he has,
as so possessed, the right that it should continue to do so; that the
defendants have interfered with this right, and prevented the free
access and departure of the wind. He adds that they have committed a nuisance to him as so possessed. He has proved that he
is possessed of a house more than twenty years old; that the wind
had access to it and passage over it for twenty years without the
hindrance recently caused by the defendants; that the defendants
have caused a hindrance by putting on the roof of their house
(which is as old as the plaintiff's), timber to a considerable height,
thereby preventing the wind blowing to and over the plaintiff's
house when in some directions, and passing away from it when in
others; that this causes his chimneys to smoke, as they did not
before, to the extent of being a nuisance. The question is if this
shows a cause of action.
First, what is the right of the occupier of a house in relation to
air independently of length of enjoyment? It is the same as that
which land and its owner or occupier have, it is not greater because
a house has been built; that puts no greater burthen or disability
on adjoining owners. What, then, is the right of land and its
owner or occupier? It is to have all natural incidents and advantages as nature would produce them. There is a right to all the
light and heat that would come, to all the rain that would fall, to
all the wind that would blow-a right that the rain which would pass
over the land should not be stopped and made to fall on it; a right
that the heat from the sun should not be stopped and reflected on
it; a right that the wind should not be checked, but should be able
to escape freely. And if it were possible that these rights were
interfered with by one having no right, no doubt an action would
lie. But these natural rights are subject to the rights of adjoining
owners, who, for the benefit of the community, have and must have
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rights in relation to the use and enjoyment of their property that
qualify and interfere with those of their neighbors-rights to use
their property in the various ways in which property is commonly
and lawfully used. A hedge, a wall, a fruit tree, would each affect
the land next to which it was planted or built. They would keep
off some light, some air, some heat, some rain, when coming from
one direction, and prevent the escape of air, of heat, of wind, of
rain, when coming from the other. But nobody could doubt that
in such cases no action would lie, nor will it in the case of a house
being built and having such consequences. That is an ordinary
and lawful use of property, as much so as the building of a wall or
planting of a fence or an orchard. Of course, the same reasoning
applies to the putting of timber on the top of a house, which, if
not a common is a perfectly lawful act; arid it would be absurd to
suppose that the defendants could lawfully put another story to
their house with the consequences to the plaintiff of which he complains, but cannot putan equal height of timber.
These are elementary and obvious considerations, but, if borne in
mind, will assist very materially in the decision of this case.
The plaintiff, then, merely as possessed of land or house, has
not the right claimed. But he goes further, and says that the
house and its owner and occupiers have had the enjoyment of this
benefit for twenty years. He, therefore, relies on that as showing
a prescriptive title, or title by lost grant. Whether he has so stated
his claim as to raise such a case, it is not necessary to say, for we
are of Dpinion that even if he has, he has not established it; that
no such right as he claims can be established by mere enjoyment,
without interruption for however long a period. It certainly cannot be claimed under the Prescription Act. Nor can it by lost
grant, unless of such a character that it could be claimed by the
common-law prescription; for the theory of a lost grant is only
applicable to cases where something prevents the application of the
common-law prescription. We do not say there might not be an
express grant or covenant not to interfere with the passage of air
over neighboring property, which could be enforced against the
grantor or covenantor, and even against his assigns with notice;
whether it could be against his assigns without notice it is not
necessary to say. But the lost grant doctrine is ancillary to the
common-law prescription doctrine. Can this right then be claimed
under that? Now, certainly the land as such has enjoyed this as
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of right for all time-since the sun first shone and the wind first
blew, and it is not a case of twenty, or any finite number of years.
But that enjoyment is the result of the natural right of which we
have spoken, and not of an acquired right. Then, does the existence of a house on the land for twenty years make any difference?
None. The owner of the land enjoyed the free passage of the air
over his land when it was a field, subject to the right of his neighbors to build on their own land, or to do on their own land any
lawful act. He now enjoys it over his land with a house on it,
subject to the same rights. If the house on his land is less commodious, by reason of any lawful act of his neighbor done on the
adjoining land, then, to use the expression of the judges in Bury v.
Pope, Cro. Eliz. 118, "it was his folly to build his house so near
to the other's land."
Itmay be said that if this reasoning is correct it is applicable to
lights. So it is to a great extent; and any one who reads the
cases relating to the acquisition of a right to light will see that
there has been great difficulty in establishing it on principle. Mr.
Justice WILLES says it is anomalous: Webb v. Bird, 10 0. B. N.
S. 285; and per Mr. Justice BLACKBURN, 13 0. -B. N. S.844.
In the case referred to of Bury v. Pope, it was held that where
there are owners of adjoining pieces of land, and one builds a
house, and for thirty or forty years has access of light to it, yet the
other may build a house adjoining and shut out the light. This
shows the general principle, though the law as to light is now different as a right is gained to it by enjoyment. But there is this
difference between this claim and the claim to light: The right in
that case is always limited to the particular window or aperture
through which the light and air have had access. It is one, therefore, against which an adjoining owner can defend himself by
blocking it up within the period necessary for the gaining of a
right. Lord WENSLEYDALE thought this a very strong thing as a
great burden on the adjoining landowner: Chasemore v. Richards.
But here the claim is of such a character that its enjoyment could
only be prevented by surrounding the land with erections as high
as it might at any time be wanted to build on the land. The principle of Chiasemore v. Richards, 7 H. L. Cas. 349, is applicable,
namely, that the right claimed is not one the law allows, being too
vague and uncertain, one the acquisition of which the adjoining
owner could not defend himself against, and that the remedy of
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the plaintiff in such a case as this is to build higher, as in such a
case as that it was to dig deeper.
We are of opinion that on principle the plaintiff fails to make
out his right as claimed. The authorities are to that effect. Webb
v. Bird, 10 0. B. N. S. 268 ; 13 0. B. N. S. 841, is really in
point. It is true that in that case the mill appeared to have been
built in 1829. I believe the date of the building of the plaintiff's
house in this case did not appear; it will hardly be supposed to be
one hundred years old. But the reasoning in that case would be
equally applicable to a claim by prescription from time whereof the
memory of man runneth not to the contrary, if the date of the
building of the plaintiff's house could not be shown. It is really
hardly necessary to notice the other cases, which are sufficiently
dealt with by the judges in Webb v. Bird. We may, however,
mention Roberts v. Haeord, 1 Moo. & R. 230, where Mr. Justice
PATTESON was of opinion that a claim like the present could not be
supported. All the reasoning and all the considerations that prevailed in Okasemore v. Bichards, are opposed to it. Where it has
been said that there is a right to air there is good ground for supposing that the wholesomeness of the air has been interfered with, or
that there was some peculiarity in the land or building which made
the air necessary in a definite place. We are of opinion, then,
that the action cannot be maintained on this ground.
But it is said, and the jury have found, that the defendants
have done that which has caused a nuisance to the plaintiff's
house. We think there is no evidence of this. No doubt there is
a nuisance, but it is not of the defendants' causing. They have
done nothing in causing the nuisance. Their house and their
timber are harmless enough. It is the plaintiff who causes the
nuisance, by lighting a coal fire in a place the chimney of which is
placed so near the defendants' wall that the smoke does not escape,
but comes into the house. Let the plaintiff cease to light his fire,
let him move his chimney, let him carry it higher, and there would
be no nuisance. 'Who, then, -causes it? • It would be very clear
that the plaintiff did, if he had built his house or chimney after the
defendants had put the timber on theirs, and it is really the same,
though he did so before the timber was there. But (what is in
truth the same answer) if the defendants cause the nuisance, they
have a right to do so. If the plaintiff has not the right to the
passage of air, except subject to the defendants' right to build or
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put timber on their house, then his right is subject to their right,
and though a nuisance follows from the exercise of their right, they
are not liable. Sic utere tuo ut alienum non lwdas is a good
maxim. But, in our opinion, the defendants do not infringe it.
The plaintiff would, if he succeeded. We are therefore of opinion,
that judgment should be for the defendants.
COTTON, L. J.-This is an appeal of the defendants from so
much of a judgment of Lord COLERIDGE in favor of the plaintiff as
was given in respect of the interruption of air to the plaintiff's
chimney, caused by the defendants. The jury have found1. That there had been for more than twenty years free access
of air to the chimneys of the plaintiff's house; 2. That the defendants interfered with it; 3. That the erection of the defendants'
wall sensibly and materially interfered with the comfort of human
existence in the plaintiff's premises; 4. That the plaintiff sustained
damage-401. by the building of the defendants' wall, and 20L by
falling of timber and other matters from defendants' stacks, on the
plaintiff's premises.
The first question is, whether the plaintiff has, either as a natural
right of property or as an easement, a right as against the defendants to have the access of air to his chimney without any interruption by the defendants. In my opinion, he has no such right.
In my opinion, it would be a contradiction in terms to say that
a man has a natural right against his neighbors in respect of a
house which is an artificial addition to, and not a user of, the land.
That the owner of a house has, as against his neighbor, no natural
rights in respect of his house, is shown by the cases as to subjacent
and lateral support. These show that while every owner of property has, independently of user, a natural right to support for his
land, if he adds buildings to his land, and thereby requires an
increased support, he, in the absence of express grant, can only
acquire a right to such support by user, that is, by way of easement.
The right (if any) of the plaintiff to the uninterrupted flow of
air to his chimney must therefore be by way of easement. Cases
to prevent, or claim damages for interference with ancient lights,
are frequently spoken of as cases of light and air, and the right
relied on as a right to the access of light and air. But this is
inaccurate. The cases, as a rule, relate solely to the interference
with the access of light, and in no case has any injunction been
VOL, XXVII.-99
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granted to restrain interference with the access of air. It is
unnecessary to say whether, if the uninterrupted flow of air
through a definite aperture or channel over a neighbor's property,
has been enjoyed as a right for a sufficient period, a right by way
of easement could be acquired. No such point is made in this case;
and I am of opinion that a right by way of easement to the access
of air over the general unlimited surface of a neighbor's property,
cannot be acquired. by such enjoyment. For this Webb v. Bird
is an authority. As the last decision in that case was in the
Exchequer Chamber, it would be sufficient to rely upon the
authority of that case. But I think, it better to say that I entirely
agree with that decision, and with the reasons given in this case by
Lord Justice BRAmwELL.

In my opinion, therefore, the plaintiff has no right in respect of
the flow of air to or from his chimney. Every man has a natural
right to enjoy the air pure and free from every noxious smell or
vapors, and any one who sends on to his neighbor's land that which
makes the air there impure, is guilty of a nuisance. Here it is
found that the erection of the defendant's wall has sensibly and
materially interfered with the comfort of human existence in the
plaintiff's house, and it is said that this is a nuisance for which the
defendants are liable. Ordinarily this is so; but the defendants
have done so not by sending on to the plaintiff's property any
smoke or nauseous vapor, but by interrupting the egress of smoke
from the plaintiff's house in a way to which, as against the defendants, the plaintiff has no legal right. The plaintiff creates the
smoke which interferes with his comfort. Unless he has as against
the defendants a right to get rid of this in the particular way
which has been interfered with by the defendants, he cannot sue
the defendants because the smoke made by himself, for which he
has not provided any effectual means of escape, causes him annoyance. As if a man tried to get rid of liquid filth arising on his
own land by a drain into his neighbor's land, until a right bad been
acquired by user, the neighbor might stop the drain without incurring liability by so doing. No doubt great inconvenience would be
caused to the owner of the property in which the liquid filth arises;
but the act of his neighbor would be a lawful act, and he would not
be liable for the consequences attributable to the fact that the man
had accumulated filth without providing any effectual means of getting rid of it.

